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CASE NOTES
Consumer Credit Protection Act—Annual Rate Disclosure on Open
End Credit Statements—Civil Liability—Bona Fide Errors—Class
Action—Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.'—The plain-
tiff entered into a Master Charge Card Agreement, a revolving credit
plan,2
 with Chemical Bank. Pursuant to this agreement, the plaintiff
made several purchases on credit, and received, at the end of the bank's
monthly billing cycle, a periodic billing statement which disclosed a
current indebtedness of $191.58 for such purchases. The statement also
disclosed that plaintiff could make an immediate ten dollar payment to
avoid delinquency charges and thereby defer payment of the obligation.
As to this deferment, the statement enumerated three periodic, i.e.,
monthly, finance charge rates' applicable to any outstanding balance in
plaintiff's account after expiration of the free ride period.' However,
the monthly statement did not disclose any type of annual finance
charge percentage rate.' The plaintiff sent Chemical Bank the ten
dollar payment required for the deferred payment plan. The plaintiff
then brought a civil action, on behalf of himself and that class of
obligors similarly situated, against Chemical Bank for the latter's
alleged violation of Section 130 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(Act)." Plaintiff contended that Chemical Bank's monthly statement
1 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
2
 This type of credit plan is characterized as "open end credit" in the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, and defined as:
a plan prescribing the terms of credit transactions which may be made
thereunder from time to time and under the terms of which a finance charge
may be computed on the outstanding unpaid balance from time to time
thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1970).
The three rates are: 1.50% for purchases up to $500, 1.00% for purchases over
$500, and 1.00% for cash advances. 329 F. Supp. at 274.
4 The free ride period is the number of days from the date of the monthly billing
statement in which the cardholder can pay the indebtedness and not incur a finance
charge. Under the Master Charge Card Agreement, the free ride period is 25 days. Id.
at 273.
6 The methods for determining the annual percentage rate on billing statements for
open end credit transactions are enumerated in § 107 of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. I 1606 (1970).
6 § 130(a) provides that:
[A]ny creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit transaction
to disclose to any person any information required under this part to be
disclosed to that person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum
of
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the trans-
action, except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less
than $100 nor greater than $1,000; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability,
the costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as deter-
mined by the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
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regarding the consumer credit transaction between plaintiff and Chemi-
cal Bank failed to discloie a nominal annual percentage rate of interest
allegedly required by Section 127(b) (5) of. the Act? and Regulation Z
of the Federal Reserve Board.' Chemical Bank countered that such a
rate was not required on a monthly billing statement unless a finance
charge was actually "applicable" to an outstanding balance on the state-
ment.' The Bank also argued that, even assuming such a requirement,
civil relief should not issue since plaintiff had not paid a finance charge. 1°
Further, Chemical Bank reasoned that, at most, it had mistakenly inter-
preted Section 127(b) of the Act, which action was a "bona fide" error
and an absolute defense as provided by Section 130(c) of the Act."
Finally, at a subsequent hearing, Chemical Bank urged that a class
action was an improper vehicle for adjudication of the controversy."
At trial, the defendant argued that the Federal Reserve Board had
primary jurisdiction over the controversy and moved for a stay of pro-
céLlings until the Board could rule on the controversy." The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction inapplicable and denied defendant's
motion." On rehearing, this order denying Chemical Bank's motion for
a stay was affirmed." The district court then granted plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment" and HELD: the Consumer Credit Protection
Act and Regulation Z require the disclosure of nominal annual per-
centage rates on a cardholder's monthly statement even though a finance
charge has not been imposed. The court determined that this conclusion
is necessitated by the clearly "prospective" intent of the Act." The
court also stated that civil liability under the Act is not predicated , on
the payment of a finance charge by a plaintiff-obligor, because the pur-
pose.of the civil recovery provision of the Act is to, encourage private
enforcement of the statute. Further, the court determined that Chemical
Bank's omission of an annual percentage rate was not a "bona fide"
error within the meaning of the Act, since Congress intended that only
clerical errors should constitute an absolute defense. Finally, the court
concluded that, notwithstanding the reasonableness of Chemical Bank's
7 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b)(5). This section also states that the nominal annual
percentage rate is to be computed by "multiplying the periodic rate by the number of
periods in a year." Id.
8
 12 C.F.R. If 226.1 et seq. (1971).
0 329 F. Supp. at 275.
10
 Id. at 280.
11 Id. at 281.
	 •
12 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
13
 309 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
14
 Id. at 987. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prescribes that where the district
courts and an administrative agency have concommitant jurisdiction over a matter,
deference should be given to the agency's determination in order to preserve uniformity
of treatment and regulation. Id. at 986.
16
 Id. at 989.
18 329 F. Supp. at 282.
17
 Id. at 276.
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interpretation of section 127, a "reasonableness" defense had not been
provided by the Act and was, therefore, unavailable to Chemical Bank
in the present action."
In a subsequent decision on the issue of whether the plaintiff could
bring a class action under the statute, the district court HELD: the
suit could not be maintained as a class action because there was not an
affirmative need for this type of adjudication." The court reasoned that
such an action would be inconsistent with the specific remedy provided
for individual obligors in Section 130(a) of the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act. 2°
This note will examine and analyze the Ratner court's conclusions
regarding the Consumer Credit Protection Act. First, this will include
an analysis of the court's determination that Section 127(b) of the Act
and Section 226.7 of Regulation Z requires some form of annual per-
centage rate disclosure on a creditor's monthly billing statement to an
obligor absent the imposition of a finance charge. Further, the court's
conclusion that Section 130 of the Act did not require a dismissal of the
plaintiff's suit will be scrutinized. Finally, the note will analyze the
court's holding that a class action would be an inappropriate remedy in
the Ratner situation.
.The main controversy in Ratner concerned the meaning of Sec-
tion 127(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act which provides in
part:
The creditor of any account under an open end consumer
credit plan shall transmit to the obligor, for each billing cycle
at the end of which there is an outstanding balance in that
account or with respect to which a finance charge is imposed,
a statement setting forth each of the following items to the
extent applicable:
. . . .
(5) Where one or more periodic rates may be used to
compute the finance charge, each such rate, the range of
balances to which it is applicable, and, unless the annual
percentage rate ... is required to be disclosed pursuant to
paragraph(6), the corresponding nominal annual percent-
age rate determined by multiplying the periodic rate by
the number of periods in a year.
(6) Where the total finance charge exceeds 50 cents for
a monthly or longer billing cycle . . . the total finance
charge expressed as an annual percentage rate. . . .21
18 Id. at 282.
10 54 F.R.D. at 414.
20 Id. at 416.
21 15 U.S.C. 1637(b) (1970) (emphasis added). Section 107(a) of the Act provides
that the annual percentage rate shall be calculated as follows:
(2) in the case of any extension of credit under an open end credit plan,
as the quotient (expressed as a percentage) of the total finance charge for the
1513
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Chemical Bank urged that the import of section 127(b) (5) was that
since a finance charge had not been "applied" to plaintiff's monthly
statement during the billing cycle, a nominal annual percentage rate
was not "applicable." In short, the defendant argued that to apply an
annual rate pursuant to the Act there must be a finance charge. Chemi-
cal Bank asserted that section 12 7 (b) (5) was fashioned to require an
"historical account of things" 22 that had actually happened, in contrast
to section 12 7 (a) which requires certain disclosures "[b] efore opening
any account under an open end consumer credit plan. . . .""
In support of this argument, Chemical Bank asserted that Regula-
tion Z, Section 226.7, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board
pursuant to the Act," did not require the alleged omitted disclosure.
Section 226.7(b) (5) requires that the periodic, i.e., monthly, percentage
rate be disclosed on the creditor's monthly statement to the cardholder
regardless of "whether or not applied during the billing cycle.""
However, section 226.7 (b) (6), which requires disclosure of an annual
rate," does not include the phrase "whether or not applied during the
billing cycle," and thus, Chemical Bank argued, does not require dis-
closure of any annual percentage rate unless a finance charge has
actually been imposed on the obligor.27 In fact, in a letter•to Chemical
Bank, the Federal Reserve Board's Deputy Secretary concluded that
Regulation Z, Section 226.7(b) (6), did not require the disclosure of an
annual percentage rate on a monthly statement if a finance charge had
not been imposed."
period to which the finance charge for that period is based, multiplied by the
number of such periods in a year.
15 U.S.C. 4 1606(a)(2) (1970).
22 329 F. Supp. at 275.
23
 Section 127(a), in pertinent part, requires that:
Cblefore opening any account under an open end consumer credit plan, the
creditor shall disclose to the person to whom credit is to be extended each
of the following items, to the extent applicable:
. . . .
(4) Where one or more periodic rates may be used to compute the
finance charge, each such rate, the range of balances to which it is ap-
plicable, and the corresponding nominal annual percentage rate determined
by multiplying the periodic rate by the number of periods in a year.
15 U.S.C.	 1637(a)(4) (1970).
24 Section 105 of the Act provides that:
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this
subchapter. These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or
other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for
any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or
proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention
or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
25 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b)(5) (1971).
26 12 C.F.R.	 226.7(b)(6) (1971).
27 329 F. Supp. at 278.
28 See 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 11 30,220 at 66,099-100 (Nov. 28, 1969) for
pertinent excerpts of the letter.
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The Ratner court was unable to accept Chemical Bank's interpreta-
tion of the Act and Regulation Z. The court reasoned that "the thrust
of the Act and its fundamental weapon of compelled disclosure is 'pro-
spective.' 129 By "prospective," the court meant that disclosure was
intended to help the consumer make decisions as to the use of credit
before entering into a transaction. The court stated that this was the
only way a consumer could adequately comprehend the myriad pos-
sibilities offered by creditors, and have the necessary tools to "intelli-
gently compare his options"" and shop for credit. The court noted
that to be able to compare effectively the cost of credit offered by
Chemical Bank's open end Master Charge Card Agreement with credit
rates of other lenders utilizing other than open end plans—i.e., savings
banks, retail merchants, and banks offering consumer loans—periodic
and annual percentage rates must be adequately disclosed, since lenders
utilizing other than open end credit plans must disclose their annual
percentage rates under the Act."
In making this determination regarding annual rate disclosures, the
court looked to the legislative history of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act. The court noted that the Senate version of the Act, S. 5, did not
require disclosure for most open end, revolving credit plans. The House
Banking and Currency Committee version of the Act, H.R. 11601,
contained similar exceptions." However, before House passage, the bill
was reworded to require annual percentage rate disclosure in open end
credit transactions, and the final conference committee version of the
bill required that either an annual or nominal annual percentage rate be
disclosed." The court further noted that the House Banking and
Currency Committee's report on H.R. 11601 reiterated that the goal
of the bill was to permit the consumer to comparison shop for credit
by reqUiring disclosure in a uniform manner." The court concluded that
"the history, in sum, is, like the statutory language on its face, com-
pellingly favorable to plaintiff's position.""
20 329 F. Supp. at 276.
so Id.
81 Id. A typical "other than open end" transaction is the traditional retail in-
stallment sale where the goods are sold on credit, and the credit price is determined by
adding the finance charge to the cash price of the article. The obligor then repays the
total credit price in predetermined fixed installments. See Jordan & Warren, Disclosure
of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1285, 1289 (1966). See § 128 of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1970), for disclosure requirements
for consumer credit sales not under an open end plan; and § 129, 15 U.S.C. § 1639
(1970), for disclosure requirements for consumer loans not under an open end plan.
82 H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(d)(2)(c) (1967). For a discussion of the
reasons for including the exceptions in H.R. 11601, see H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13-17 (1967).
88 H.R. Rep. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1968).
89 329 F. Supp. at 276.
85 Id. at 277. Chemical Bank further contended that the phrase, "to the extent
applicable" in the context of § 127(b) of the Act meant "applied" to an outstanding
balance on a monthly statement. This interpretation was also rejected by the Ratner
court on the basis of a comparison of § 127(b) with § 127(a). The court noted that
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As to Chemical Bank's contention that Regulation Z did not
require disclosure of a nominal annual percentage rate, thi court replied
that the clear intent of Section 226.7 of Regulation Z was the same as
Section 127 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The court stated
that the draftsmen of Regulation Z, Section 226.7, had "done' no more'
than attempt a useful simplification . . . when they undertook to shorten
and streamline the thoughts" of Section 127 of the Act." The court ,
further stated that there was no reasonable argument for requiring a
periodic, i.e., monthly, percentage rate disclosure and not requiring some
form of annual percentage rate disclosure. The court concluded that
since disclosure of an annual percentage rate would be more useful to
the consumer as a comparison-shopping tool, it was more logical to
include the annual percentage rate than the periodic percentage rate."
Finally, the court was not persuaded by the letter from the Federal
Reserve Board to the defendant, which interpreted Section 226.7(b) (6)
of Regulation Z as not requiring annual.percentage rate disclosure on
a monthly statement absent a finance charge. 88 Noting that the letter
did not refer to the Consumer Credit Protection Act, and that it
probably failed to integrate Sections 226.7(b) (6) and 226.7(b) (5) of
Regulation Z, the court rejected the correspondence as an "insufficient
analysis of the pertinent materials.""
It is submitted that the Ratner court correctly interpreted the Act
as requiring nominal annual percentage rate disclosure, even absent a
finance charge. The disclosure aspects of the Act were specifically
designed, in the words of Senator Paul Douglas, to "restore consumer
sovereignty in the consumer credit market place. Every individual has
the right to know what he is paying for credit.' In addition, sponsors
of the Act argued that the disclosure sections of the Act would "strip
away the disguises which frequently hide or distort the true - price of
credit."' As was stated in a report issued by the House Banking and
Currency Committee, full disclosure of credit charges would
aid' the consumer in deciding for himself the reasonableness
of credit charges imposed and further permit the consumer to
"comparison" shop for credit . . . . [F]ull disclosure of the
terms and conditions of credit charges [would] encourage a
wiser and more judicious use of consumer credit."
§ 127(a), which requires disclosure of the periodic and nominal annual percentage rates
to potential cardholders before execution of open end credit agreements, also contains
the phrase "to the extent applicable." Thus, the court concluded that since nothing
could have been "applied" under § 127(a), "applicable" can only mean "relevant" in the
context of the Act. Id. at 275.
. 80
 Id. at 278.
87 Id.
28
 Id. at 279.
89 Id.
40 ,Hearings on S. 750 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at'2 (1963).
41 Id. at 3.
42 H.R. Rep. No. 1040, supra note 32, at 7.
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The concept of disclosure can be effective and useful for the consumer
only if the finance charge disclosure invites and permits comparison.
If the disclosure is such that it does in fact encourage comparison of
annual rates, the consumer can make meaningful decisions as to which
type of credit best suits his needs and, more importantly, which creditor
can give him the best credit arrangement. This means that disclosure as
to amounts' and percentage rates would have to be made in a uniform
manner by all creditors, for all types of credit they offer, so as to
enable the consumer to compare costs effectively."
As previously noted, the Senate version of the Act, S. 5, exempted
revolving credit plans from annual percentage rate disclosure. The
conference committee, however, inserted section 127(b) (6), which
requires nominal annual percentage rate disclosure, in the final version
of the legislation, and in so doing implicitly acknowledged that dis-
closure of an annual percentage rate would not be an accurate reflection
of credit charges in all situations." The committee noted that the effect
of Section 127(b) (6) of the Act wouid be such that:
In any statement of an account under an open end plan under
43 A supplemental view of a number of senators expressed the opinion that:
[The] purpose [of the Consumer Credit Protection Act] is to insure to the
consumer sufficient, clearly understandable and readily comparable information
to enable him to measure various types of consumer credit proposals with one
another, and then decide with reasonable accuracy, which offer is more suitable
to his economic situation, or a better buy, or whether he should dip into his
savings or make other arrangements to avoid using credit in a particular
situation.
Id. at 106, For a Judicial discussion of the, purposes of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, see Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, — U.S. —, 40 U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972) (No. 829); and Strompolos
v. Premium Readers Service, 326 F. Supp, 1100, 1102 (ED. III. 1971).
44
 H.R. Rep. No. 1397, supra note 33, at 27. See also H.R. Rep. No, 1040, supra
note 32, at 14. This conclusion is also supported by a 1965 study of revolving credit
accounts:
[A] leading retailer selected at random 205 of its revolving credit accounts and
calculated, on the basis of the annual interest on the declining balance, the actual
rate of the finance charge for the period September 10, 1964, through September
9, 1965. The results were as follows:
Annual Rate Number of Accounts Per-Cent-Total
0% 53 25.8%
1%-9.9% 23 , 11.2%
10%-14.9% 27 13.2%
15%46.9% 22 10.7%
17%-17.9% 40 1 19.5%
18%48.9% 28 13.7%
19%-20.9% 12 5.9%
205 100.0%
. . . If this sampling is representative of revolving credit accounts, it indicates
clearly that it is not accurate to equate the PA% monthly charge with an 18%
annual rate as is sometimes suggested.
Jordan & Warren, supra note 31, at 1307.
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which a rate may be used to compute the finance charge (even
though, for the particular month the rate may yield a charge
below the minimum and thus be inapplicable) the creditor
must state the periodic rate and the "nominal'? annual per-
centage rate . . • .0
Recommending the conference committee's amendment of this
provision, Senator Proxmire stated:
The conference committee has recommended that both
the periodic or monthly rate and the annual rate be disclosed.
Under this approach, creditors with revolving credit plans
would disclose to their customers that in the typical case they
are charging for credit at the rate of 1% percent a month or
18 percent per year.
I believe the report of the conference committee repre-
sents an effective and realistic solution to the knotty problem
or revolving credit. It recognizes the importance of annual
rate disclosure on all forms of revolving credit plans."
It is submitted, then, that this legislative history indicates that
the Ratner court correctly interpreted the Consumer Credit Protection
Act as requiring at least a nominal annual percentage rate disclosure on
a creditor's monthly billing statement regardless of whether a finance
charge has been imposed. The consumer can only weigh and compare
his credit alternatives if rates among the different creditors are dis-
closed in a uniform manner, and such uniform disclosure would appear
to require revealing the nominal anual percentage rate. Nominal
annual percentage rate disclosure on monthly statements can be helpful
to a consumer in two ways. First, with knowledge of such a rate, the
consumer can decide before his payments are due whether he will use
credit which can be extended over a number of months. Furthermore,
the consumer can compare, before entering into an open end credit
transaction, the rate offered by one creditor with annual rates offered by
45 H.R. Rep. No. 1397, supra note 33, at 27. Concern was also expressed that disclosure
of periodic percentage rates alone could be misleading, and would give an unfair competi-
tive advantage to open end creditors. See H.R. Rep. No. 1040, supra note 32, at 108-09.
See also Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 126 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; and Comment, An Analysis of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
889, 899 (1971).
48 114 "Cong. Rec. 14487-88 (1968) (remarks of Senator Proxmire). A number of
members of the House Banking and Currency Committee pointed out that the original
House version of the bill, H.R. 11601, contained a "loophole" that "would defeat the
basic thrust of [the bill]." This "loophole was the open end exemption which would
allow open end creditors "to express their credit charges to the customer on a periodic
percentage rate basis ... rather than the annual rate method prescribed in the bill for all
other forms of consumer credit . . . . " H.R. Rep. No. 1040, supra note 32, at 107.
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other creditors, Disclosure after a finance charge has been imposed on
the cardholder can only serve to lirriit the consumer's ability to shop
for credit, and destroy the Act's explicitly "prospective" orientation.
The Ratner court's holding on the second issue—that Regulation
Z requires the disclosure of an annual percentage rate on a monthly
statement—is less satisfactory. The court appears to have misinterpreted
the language of Section 226.7(b) of Regulation Z. This section pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that:
[T]he creditor of any open end account shall mail or deliver to
the customer, for each billing cycle at the end of which there
is an outstanding debit balance in excess of $1 in that account
or with respect to which a finance charge is imposed, a state-
ment or statements . . . setting forth . . . each of the following
items to the extent applicable:
(5) Each periodic rate . . . that may be used to compute
the finance charge (whether or not applied during the
billing cycle). . . .
(6) The annual percentage rate or rates determined un-
der § 226.5(a). . .47
Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the Ratner court's determination
that in the Regulation, as in the Act, "applicable" does not mean
"applied," the court's characterization of Section 226.7 of Regulation
Z, as a "useful simplification of the Act,"" is not an accurate reflection
of the Regulation's language. The Act provides that when at the end
of a billing cycle there is an outstanding balance or imposition of a
finance charge, the creditor is required to disclose one of two annual
rates. If the total finance charge exceeds 50 cents for the billing cycle,
subsection 127(b) (6)" requires that, the creditor calculate and disclose
an "annual percentage rate" in accordance with Section 107(a) (2) of
the Act. The latter section provides, in part, that this rate shall be
computed by utilizing:
the quotient (expressed as a percentage) of the total finance
charge for the period to which it relates divided by the amount
upon which the finance charge for that period is based, multi-
plied by the number of such periods in a year.°
The significance of this section is that in order to compute the
"annual percentage rate" a finance charge must be imposed on the
cardholder and used in rate computation. In contrast, subsection
127(b) (5) provides that if the finance charge is 50 cents or less, the
creditor shall disclose the rate as a "nominal annual percentage rate,"
47 12 cy.R. I§ 226.7(b) (5) and (6) (1971).
48 329 F. Supp. at 278.
40 15 US.C. § 1637(b)(6) (1970).
60 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(2) (1970).
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51
 15 U.S.C. I
52 12 C.F.R. I
55
 12 C.F.R. I
" 329 F. Supp
53 - F. Supp.
Sept. 29, 1971). See
v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
(N.D. III. Feb. 11, 1
58
 15 U.S.C. I
57 12 C.F.R. I
1637(b)(5) (1970).
226.7 (1971).
226.5(a) (1971).
. at 278.
—, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 99,356 at 89,317 (W.D.N.Y.
also MoLirning v. Family Publications Service, note 43, and Garland
— F. Supp. —, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 99,558 at 89,514
971).
1635(a) (1970).
226.9(a) (1971).
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and calculate that rate by multiplying the periodic, i.e., monthly rate by
the number of periods in a year." Subsection 127(b) (5) is therefore
distinguishable from subsection 127(b) (6) since the former does not
require the imposition of an actual finance charge for calculation of the
rate, while the latter does.
In contrast to Section 127 (b) of the Consumer Credit Protection.
Act, Regulation Z, Section 226.7, requires only the disclosure of an
"annual percentage rate' and does not include provision for a
"nominal annual percentage rate." In conjunction with Section
226.5(a)" of. the Regulation, Section 226.7 requires the imposition of
a finance charge to.calculate an "annual percentage rate" and, absent
a finance charge, the, rate cannot be calculated. The important distinc-
tion, then, between the Act and the Regulation is the omission of a
"nominal annual percentage rate" provision from Section 226.7 of
Regulation Z.
Under Regulation Z, therefore, a. creditor need not include an
annual rate of any kind if he has not imposed a finance charge on the
cardholder. This result would appear to be contrary to the language and
intention of Subsections 127(b) (5) and (6) of the Act as described
above. In the face of this conflict, it is submitted that the Federal
Reserve Board has done more than merely shorten and streamline the
"thoughts" of Section 127 of the Act;" the Board has radically altered
explicit statutory language. •
Unfortunately, this apparent inconsistency between Section 127
of the Act and Section 226.7 of Regulation Z was neither recognized
nor discussed by the Ratner court. However, decisions subsequent to
Ratner have resolved other conflicts between the Act and Regulation Z,
in favor of the Act. In N.C. Freed Co. v. Federal Reserve Board," the
plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment regarding an apparent
conflict between Section 125(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act" and Section 226.9(a) of Regulation Z." Plaintiff was in the
business of repairing and remodeling homes and, to this end, entered
into contracts with homeowners. Under these contracts,. if a homeowner
desired to defer payment, provision was made for the execution of a
promissory note in favor of the plaintiff as consideration for the • latter's
extension of credit.
Plaintiff sought to have Section 226.9(a) of Regulation Z declared
null and void, on the ground that the section enlarged the scope of an
1520
CASE NOTES
obligor's right of rescission beyond the scope granted in Section 125(a)
of the Act. This enlargement was due, plaintiff argued, to the fact that
the Act permitted rescission only when a security interest was taken in
the obligor's residence by the creditor, while Regulation Z allowed
rescission when a security interest might attach to an obligor's resi-
dence by operation of law.
The Freed court found that Section 226.9(a) of Regulation Z
had "enlarged the scope of contract rescission" found in Section 125(a)
of the Act." The court, agreeing with the plaintiff, noted that section
125 (a) allows an obligor to rescind a transaction, if, pursuant to the
transaction, a security interest "is retained or acquired" in the obligor's
residence as a condition for the extension of credit. The court also
recognized that section 226.9 (a) permits the obligor to rescind a credit
transaction in which a security interest "is or will be retained or
acquired" in the obligor's residence—i.e., mechanics' liens or other
security interests which might arise by operation of law. On the basis of
this analysis and a determination that Congress did not intend to include
future security interests within the ,clear, specific coverage of Section
125(a) of the Act, the court concluded that Section 226.9(a) of Regula-
tion Z was an ultra vires promulgation and, therefore, "null and void.""
As the Freed court recognized, the Federal Reserve Board's author-
ity to promulgate Regulation Z was derived from authority granted to
the Board by the Act. This authority permits the Board to issue regula-
tions which will "carry out the purposes" of the Act, and does not
include authority to extend the substantive provisions of the Act by
means of regulatory promulgation. Further, since Section 125 (a) of
the Act explicitly indicates when the right of rescission is granted to
an obligor, it would appear that the Act sufficiently and unambiguously
delineates the rights and obligations of both the creditor and obligor,
thus requiring that companion Section 226.9(a) of Regulation Z be
a complementary reiteration of Section 12 5(a).
The Freed decision indicates that if a section of Regulation Z
enlarges upon the scope of its unambiguous companion section in the
Act, the courts should strike down the deviating section of the Regula-
tion. It is submitted that this reasoning should have been applied to
the Act-Regulation conflict in Ratner and should be applied in future
disputes involving the same regulatory and statutory provisions as those
in Ratner. Although factually distinguishable, the conflict in Freed is
very similar to the conflict in Ratner. In Ratner, as in Freed, the
pertinent sections of Regulation Z were not absolutely necessary for an
understanding or effectuation of the corresponding complemented sec-
tions in the Act. Section 127 (b) of the Act, which was involved in the
Ratner dispute, is very explicit as to the disclosure of finance charges
by the creditor. Further, section 107(a) carefully provides for deter-
58 - F. Supp. at —, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide II 99,356 at 89,318.
59 Id. at —, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide I 99,356 at 89,319.
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urination of an "annual percentage rate," while section 127(b) (5)
specifically explains how to calculate a "nominal annual percentage
rate," and when it is to be used. The effect of these sections is to provide
the creditor with sufficient disclosure information so that he can comply
with the Act. Therefore, since the complementary sections of Regula-
tion Z involved in the Ratner and Freed disputes do not adequately
reflect the policy of the Act, the offending sections of Regulation Z
should be discarded.
The Board, in-an attempt to resolve the inherent conflict between
Section 127 of the Act and Section 226.7 of Regulation Z, has proposed
an amendment to Subsection 226.7(b) (5) of the Regulation which
provides, in part:
Whether or not a finance charge is imposed during the
billing cycle, each periodic rate (whether or not applied during
the billing cycle) . . . and the "corresponding nominal annual
percentage rate" . . . determined by multiplying the periodic
rate by the number of periods in a year [must be disclosed
by the creditor on a monthly billing statement]."
In effect, the amendment provides that creditors are required to disclose
a "nominal annual percentage" rate on monthly statements to obligors
regardless of whether a finance charge has been imposed. The amend-
ment, therefore, reflects, and was probably prompted by, the decision
of the Ratner court that the Consumer Credit Protection Act requires,
even absent a finance charge, some type of annual percentage rate dis-
closure. It is submitted . that the amendment should be adopted to
obviate any future conflicts between Subsections 127(b) (5) and (6)
of the Act and Subsection 226.7(b) (6) of Regulation Z.
In light of the Ratner court's conclusion that Regulation Z requires
disclosure of a "nominal annual percentage rate,"—a conclusion con-
trary to the position taken by the Board in its letter to Chemical Bank
—a further question arises as to the weight to be given to informal
Board correspondence. In Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc.,61
the plaintiff alleged that her purchase of insurance on credit from the
defendant violated Section 128 of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act," and Section 226.8 of Regulation Z," in that the agreement failed
to disclose, inter alia, the cash price, the cash down payment and the
unpaid cash balance of the transaction. Plaintiff alleged that the trans-
action was a "credit sale" and that defendant was liable under Section
130 of the Act because the omitted disclosures allegedly violated Section
128 of the Act and Section 226.8 of Regulation Z. The defendant, on
the other hand, contended that the transaction was a loan and that this
fact precluded its liability.
60 1 CCH Consumer Credit Guide II 3556 at 3333 (Aug. 5, 1971).
01 326 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
62 15 U.S.C.	 1638 (1970):
62 12 C.F.R.	 226.8 (1971).
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Defendant's liability depended on whether the credit transaction
was a loan or a credit sale. In deciding this question, the court con-
sidered a letter from the Board which'characterized a similar agreement
as a credit sale. However, the court rejected this credit sale characteriza-
tion, and noted that "[w]hile such correspondence releases by the
Federal Reserve Board are persuasive to this Court, they are not bind-
ing authority as to questions of interpretation of federal law."" As part
of its rationale for rejecting the Board's credit sale characterization,
the Ste fanski court noted that comparison of the Board's hypothetical
transaction and the Stefanski transaction was difficult because the court
was unable to determine if the transactions were the same or even
similar. Further, the court concluded that the Board letter was an
incomplete analysis of all pertinent factors which might assist in deter-
mining the character of the transaction."
Stefanski is significant in several respects. The court made it clear
that judicial deference to a Board letter interpreting Regulation Z
depends, in part, on the degree of similarity between the transaction
discussed in the letter and the transaction being adjudicated by the
court. If the two transactions are dissimilar, or if there is not sufficient
information to make an adequate comparison, a court should not con-
sider the Board's interpretation. Further, as the court in Stefanski
pointed out, the Board letter must include a complete analysis of all
factors which could possibly assist in the characterization of a trans-
action. Since a court must make a complete analysis of these factors
pursuant to a proper adjudication of the dispute, a Board interpretation
which is not founded on similar analysis should not be substituted for
the court's judgment.
In certain respects, Ratner is analogous to Stefanski. Even though
the letter discussed by the Ratner court was interpreting a section of
Regulation Z, while the Stefanski letter characterized a transaction
between creditor and debtor, the courts similarly concluded that the
Board's letters were lacking as to a complete analysis of the pertinent
information which might affect the letters' characterization or inter-
pretation. In Ratner, the Board's letter did not discuss the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, nor did it interrelate pertinent sections of Regula-
tion Z. In addition, it must be noted that these letters are merely "staff
opinions" and not formal administrative interpretations of Regulation
Z." It would seem, then, that an insufficient analysis of all pertinent and
04 326 F. Supp. at 142.
05 Id. The court did not elaborate on this point other than to indicate that these
"ether factors" included a consideration of pertinent state laws.
00 The Deputy Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board has described a "staff
opinion" as "the informed view of the particular official responding to the inquiry. . • ."
The Deputy Secretary has further pointed out that "it is possible that in some instances
[staff opinions) might not represent the position which the Board members themselves
would take if they formally considered the issue. . . ." 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide
30,640 at 66,283 (March 1, 1971). For a discussion of the authoritative weight of
formal administrative interpretations, see Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 329 F.
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relevant factors by the Board should not be accorded substantial defer-
ence by the courts, nor routinely substituted for the courts' independent
judgment.
Chemical Bank's final argument, notwithshanding the court's deter-
mination that an annual percentage rate disclosure, absent a finance
charge, was required by Section 127 of the Act, was that plaintiff's suit
should have been dismissed on three separate grounds based on Section
130 of the Act. This section provides in part that:
(a) any creditor who fails in connection with any consumer
credit transaction to disclose to any person any information
required under this part to be disclosed to that person is liable
to that person in an amount equal to the sum of
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection
with the transaction, except that the liability under this
paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor .greater than
$1,000; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the
foregoing liability, the costs of the action together with
a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.
(c) a creditor may not be held liable in any action brought
under this section for a violation of this part if the creditor
shoWs by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was
not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwith-
standing the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid any such error."
Chemical Bank's first defense under Section 130 was that the
plaintiff had not incurred or paid a finance charge, and therefore Chem-
ical Bank could not be held liable under Section 130(a) of the Act.
Further, Chemical Bank argued that section' 130(c) provided a "good
faith" defense since the 'alleged violation was not intentional. Finally,
Chemical Bank'asserted that the alleged Aolation resulted from a "rea-
sonable interpretation" of Section 127 of the Act and, therefore, Chemi-
cal Bank should not be subjected to the "penalty" provided for in
Section 130(a).68
Notwithstanding Chemical Bank's argument that the plaintiff must
have incurred or paid a finance charge in order to compute liability
under section 130(a), the Ratner court concluded that liability under
that section was not based on the imposition or payment of a finance
charge. On the Contrary, the court stated that liability under section
130(a) is determined by the failure of a creditor to disclose to the
obligor certain information as required by the Act. The imposition of a
Supp. 936, 939 (ND. Ill. 1971). See also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965); and
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945),
87 15 U.S.C. Si 1640 (1970).
88 329 F. Supp. at 282.
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finance charge, the court noted, was signifitant, but not controlling, only
for determination of damages" since it was "sufficient for present pur-
poses that . . . there was a readily knowable 'finance charge in connec-
tion with the transaction.. . "7°
To buttress the determination that a finance charge was not neces-
sary for civil recovery, the court concluded that Congress intended the
$100 minimum civil recovery as more than just "a handy reference
point," and had set up this minimum recovery, notwithstanding the
imposition of a finance charge, as part of a broader scheme of recovery.
The court stated that Congress, in enacting Section 130 of the Act,
intended to create "private attorneys general" who would be one of the
Act's most vital and effective enforcement weapons.'" The implementa-
tion of civil recovery "invited people like the present plaintiff, whether
they were themselves deceived or not, to sue in the public interest.'
The Ratner court concluded that to deny plaintiff civil recovery would
impede the congressional policy of encouraging suits by "private at-
torneys general" and destroy the Act's most potent enforcement weapon.
The use of private attorneys general as a statutory enforcement
tool is not a novel concept. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc.," the petitioners instituted a class action seeking an injunction
under Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 74 The petitioners had
allegedly been barred from eating at the defendant's drive-in restaurants
solely on account of petitioners' race and color. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that petitioners could be
awarded counsel fees, as provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, only
to the extent that the defendant's defenses had been raised "for pur-
poses of delay and not in good faith."" On certiorari, the Supreme Court
modified the circuit court's decision so as to award the petitioners
reasonable attorney's fees, notwithstanding the defendant's motives for
raising particular defenses." In so holding, the Court concluded that
when an individual seeks an injunction under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, he does so not only for himself, but also as a " 'private attorney
general' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority."" The Court reasoned that there would be few parties who
could afford to defend the public interest by coming into a federal court
if they were saddled with attorney's fees and court costs."
00
 Id. at 280.
70
 Id. (emphasis added). Although the court was vague as to what constituted
this "knowable" finance charge, it is reasonable to assume that the court was referring
to the finance charge that would be imposed on plaintiff for not paying the outstanding
indebtedness during the free ride period.
71 329 F. Supp. at 280.
72 Id.
78 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
74 42 U.S.C. § 2000a at seq. (1970).
70 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967).
70 390 at 402-03.
77 Id. at 402.
78 id.
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Newman, like Ratner, can be said to stand for the proposition that
in order to encourage a potential plaintiff to vindicate a violation of a
statutory public policy, an economic incentive must be .provided to
the potential plaintiff. This incentive—i.e., .attorney's fees and court
costs in Newman, and civil recovery in Ratner—encourages individuals
to become private attorneys general. Inherent in the concept of private
attorneys general is a realization that private citizens are needed as a
complethent to bureaucratic organizations and enforcement agencies
which are often ineffective because of the limited scope of their enforce-
ment powers and an "inability to make expeditious determinations.'" 9
It is submitted, then, that in light of the congressional policy of utilizing
private attorneys general, the Ratner court has correctly determined
that the imposition or payment of a finance charge is not a prerequisite
for civil recovery.
In the face of this unfavorable determination by the court in
Ratner, Chemical Bank alternatively argued that the alleged violation
was unintentional and a "bona fide" error which would constitute an
absolute defense as provided by Section 130(c) of the Act." However,
the court rejected this argument and pointed out that Chemical Bank's
failure to disclose any type of annual percentage rate, even though based
on a mistaken interpretation of Section 127 of the Act, was an inten-
tional violatiOn Of the Act and proscribed by Section 130(t) . 81 The
court further reasoned that, in light of the available legislative history,
the defense of "bona fide" errors was allowable under the Act only for
clerical errors and "[a] defendant invoking this excuse is required not
merely to show [that] the clerical error was unintentional, but also that
due care has been taken to set up procedures to avoid it."" Thus, in
Ratner, the court's characterization of Chemical Bank's mistaken
interpretation of the Act as an "intentional" violation under Section
130(c), indicates that any adverse consequences of a mistake of law
regarding a truth-in-lending violation shOuld be imposed on the party
making the mistake.
It is submitted that this characterization is correct since anything
short of such a determination could, in effect, destroy the clear state-
ment in section 130(a) that a credit& who simply "fails . . . to dis-
close"" is liable under the section. A further indication that Section
70
 Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395; 444 (1966). See also Boyd, The Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act—A Consumer Perspective, 45 Notre Dame Lawyer 171 (1970). The
author notes that often "lhieavy reliance is placed on public enforcement through
criminal prosecutions and administrative proceedings, while to date established public
agencies, in general, have had a less than enviable record in furthering the consumer's
interest." Id. at 182.
80 329 F. Supp. at 281.
81 Id,
82 Id. See Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Ihstitutions of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 374, 698 (1967). [Herein-
after cited as Hearings on S. 5.]
83
 15 U.S.C.4§ 1640(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
1526
CASE NOTES
130(c) does not require a violation to be willful or knowing arises from
a comparison of that section with Section 112 of the Act," which
provides criminal liability for the creditor who "willfully and know-
ingly" fails to comply with the Consumer Credit Protection Act's
requirements. Moreover, the legislative history concerning section
130(c)—though unfortunately sparse—seems to support the court's
determination in Ratner. The original version of the Senate truth-in-
lending bill, S. 5, did not even contain the express exemption for "bona
fide" errors presently found in Section 130(c) of the Act. In response
to this omission, numerous creditors, testifying before the Subcom-
mittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee, contended that because open end credit percentage rate
computations could be highly complex, errors of a mathematical and
clerical nature could arise quite frequently." It is reasonable to assume,
then, that Section 130(c) of the Act was enacted to remedy this situa-
tion. Thus, application of the defense provided in that section should
be restricted to clerical errors.
However, the legislative history is not the only indication of the
meaning of "bona fide" errors. Section 130(b) of the Act provides:
A creditor has no liability tinder this section if within
fifteen days after discovering an error . . . the creditor notifies
the person concerned of the error and makes whatever adjust-
ments in the appropriate account are necessary to insure that
person will not be required to pay a finance charge in excess
of the amount or percentage rate actually disclosed.8°
The clear language of section 130(b) reinforces the conclusion that the
"bona fide" errors defense provided in section 130(c) was extended only
to clerical errors. Indeed, the statute is directed only to errors which
might cause an obligor "to pay a finance charge in excess of the amount
84 15 U.S.C. { 1611 (1970). The original House version of H.R. 11601 required proof
of a "knowing" violation for civil liability. H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(a)(1)
(1967). The Justice Department, in a letter to Representative Wright Patman, was of
the view that:
The requirement of proof of specific knowledge, which the Department does not
believe is required in a criminal proceeding, is certainly not required by fairness
in a civil proceeding. The burden of proving specific knowledge by an offending
creditor might frustrate prospective plaintiffs, and thereby weaken the enforce-
ment provisions of the act.
House Hearings, supra note 45, at 903.
85 See Hearings on S. 5, supra note 82, at 374, 698.
80 15 U.S.C. § 1640(h) (1970) (emphasis added).
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has suggested, in
S. 652, an amendment to § 130(b) of the Act. The bill adds the words "for any failure to
comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter" after the first "this section"
in § 130(b). Since the phrase "to insure that person will not be required to pay a finance
charge in excess of the amount or percentage rate actually disclosed" has not been
deleted, the proposed addendum confuses the actual meaning of the section. This
addendum does not appear to change the discussion of the section in the text. S. 652, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., § 208(b) (1972).
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or percentage rate actually disclosed." This 'language is directed to
the correction of an erroneous disclosure on the billing statement, and
in no way appears to include an erroneous failure to disclose as involved
in Ratner.
To date, the Ratner court's restricted interpretation of the Act's
"bona fide" error provision has, with one exception, been followed by
other courts. 87
 In the exceptional decision, Richardson v. Time Premium
Co.," the plaintiff purchased an automobile liability insurance policy
from the defendant. Pursuant to the transaction, the defendant required
the plaintiff to sign a finance agreement which provided for payments to
another defendant. This finance agreement, the plaintiff alleged, was in
violation of Regulation Z because the agreement substituted the phrase
"total balance due" in place of the words "total of payments" which
were required by Section 226.8(b) (3) of the Regulation." Further,
the agreement utilized the words "amount to be financed" instead of
the phrase "amount financed" as required by section 226.8(d) (1)."
Therefore, plaintiff argued, the defendant was liable under Section
130(a) of the Act for this failure to utilize terminology required by the
Act. The court concluded that defendants' terminology had in fact
violated the provisions of Regulation Z, but did not find the defendants
liable for the violations. The court reasoned that:
[The] defendants' failure to comply with the regulations is a
de minimus violation which is clearly contemplated by [Sec-
tion 130 of the Act]. The agreement on its face reflects the
use of a procedure to insure proper disclosure. It strains
credulity that defendants gained any advantage by the vari-
ance.. . .01
However, in light of the submitted accuracy of the conclusion in
Ratner that Congress intended Section 130 of the Act to exempt only
clerical errors, the contrary conclusion in Richardson should be viewed
with skepticism. Although the defendants' violation may have been
"de minimus," section 130(c) does not expressly exempt incidental
violations, nor does any language in the statute even remotely suggest
such an exemption. In addition, contrary to the determination in
Richardson, the Act does not predicate liability on a creditor gaining any
"advantage" by his violation. Indeed, the Richardson court made no
mention of the source or basis in reason for the "de minimus" and
"advantage gained" tests which were used in applying section 130(c).
Further, the Richardson court failed to consider the statute's legisla-
87 See Buford v. American Finance Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971); and
Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Alas. 1971).
88 - F. Supp.	 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 99,272 at 89,237 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 14, 1971).
89 12 C.F.R.
	
226.8(b)(3) (1971).
90 12 C.F.R.	 226.8(d)(1) (1971).
91 - F. Supp. at —, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide ¶ 99,272 at 89,239 (emphasis
added).
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Live history, or even to mention the prior careful analysis of the section
in Ratner.
Chemical Bank's final argument based on Section 130 of the Act
was that the defendant's mistaken interpretation of Section 127 was at
least "reasonable," and, accordingly, should not be subject to the
"penalty" imposed by Section 130(a). However, the court rejected this
argument, reasoning that section 130(a) provided remedial civil re-
covery, rather than a penalty. The court noted that Section 130(a)
would have been superfluous legislation were it to be interpreted as
imposing a penalty, since criminal sanctions were already provided in
Section 112 of the Act. 92
 Further, the court concluded that "the aim
to protect consumers is the paramount aspect of the statute; the
countenancing of 'reasonable' violations would be grossly subversive
of that.'
Thus, the Ratner court appears to have concluded that the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act imposes strict liability for erroneous inter-
pretations of that statute. The court has, in effect, balanced the interests
of the obligor against those of the creditor, and, finding that the
"paramount aspect" of the Act is to protect consumers, concluded that
the Act necessitates a finding that the weight of the balance must fall
in favor of the obligor. This is not to say that Chemical Bank did not
make a "good faith," reasonable interpretation of Section 226.7 of
Regulation Z. Nor does it seem entirely fair that Chemical Bank must
incur civil liability because the Federal Reserve Board, in promulgating
section 226.7, misinterpreted Section 127(b) of the Act. However, in
light of the small civil recovery contemplated by the Act, it is submitted
that creditors, as opposed to obligors, are better able to bear the burdens
of a mistaken interpretation of law. A less stringent determination
might encourage creditors to be less cautious when attempting to comply
with the requirements of the Act."
Subsequent to the Ratner decision that Chemical Bank had violated
the Act and was therefore liable under Section 130, the court considered
921 329 F. Supp. at 282. For a general statement that the recovery provided in
§ 130(a) is remedial rather than penal, see Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875, 878
(N.D. Ohio 1970).
03 329 F. Supp. at 282.
04 S. 652 would also amend § 130 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act by adding
a new section:
No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or
omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulations, or interpretation
thereof by the Board, or in conformity with any interpretation issued by any
other agency designated in section 108 unless such interpretation has, prior to the
time such act was done or omitted, been determined by the Board to be incon-
sistent with the Board's rules, regulations or interpretations, notwithstanding
that after such act or omission has occurred, such rule, regulation, or interpreta-
tion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be
invalid for any reason.
S. 652, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., § 206 (1972). However, it is submitted that this proposed
"good faith" defense is similar to Chemical Bank's "reasonableness" defense, and, there-
fore, is susceptible to the same objections.
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the plaintiff's argument that the suit could be maintained as a class
action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." However, the
court rejected this argument, reasoning that a class action in the
situation involved in Ratner would be "essentially inconsistent with
the specific remedy supplied by Congress."°° The court determined
that Section 130(a) provided incentive for potential individual plain-
tiffs to sue under the Act because of the provision for a minimum
recovery of one hundred dollars even absent proof of damage." In
addition, the court indicated that a judgment of one hundred dollars for
each of the 130,000 obligors of Chemical Bank would be a grossly
unreasonable punishment." Further, the court determined that a class
action, under the circumstances involved in Ratner, would not be
"superior to" other means of adjudicating the controversy." The court
felt these considerations were important in light of the fact that "the
broad and open-ended terms [of Rule 23] call for some considerable
discretion of a pragmatic nature." loo
Generally, the federal judiciary has been divided as to whether
119 Rule 23(b) provides in part, that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of sub-
division (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests. . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiff further relied on subdivision (b)(3) of the Rule which
provides that a class action can be permitted if the "prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied" and
The court finds that the question of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
96 54 F.R.D. at 415.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. Although the court did not expand upon this statement, presumably it con-
sidered that an individual suit, as utilized by the plaintiff in Rattier, constituted one of
these "other means."
100 Id. The court did not specifically indicate which "terms" were to be regarded as
"open ended" but a reading' of Rule 23 will disclose that the court was referring to terms
such as "superior," "fair," "efficient" and "desirability." See note 95 supra.
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class actions are permitted under the Act."' However, one of the
recognized fundamental purposZs of a class action is to provide in-
centive for injured parties to sue as a group where individual actions
might be economically unattractive because of possible minimum re-
coveries.'° 2
 In light of this fundamental purpose, it is submitted that
the court in Ratner correctly concluded that the one hundred dollar
minimum civil recovery and reasonable attorney fees provide adequate
incentive for individual consumers to bring civil actions under the
Consumer Credit Protection Act.'"
101
 For cases allowing class actions under the Act see La Mar v. H&B Novelty &
Loan Co., — F. Supp. —, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide it 99,239 at 89,213 (D. Ore.
Jan. 27, 1972); Martin v. Family Publications Service, — F. Supp. —, 4 CCH Consumer
Credit Guide 11 99,267 at 89,235 (D. Vt. June 30, 1971); Berkman v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., — F. Supp..--, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 99,270 at 89,236 (N.D. Ill.
June 25, 1971). For cases not allowing class actions under the Act see: Rogers v. Coburn
Finance Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Allerton v. Century Credit Corp., —
F. Supp. —, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide If 99,271 at 89,237 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
12, 1971).
102
 See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967). There, the California Supreme Court, in allowing class recovery, concluded that
[Albsent a class suit, recovery by any of the individual [members of the alleged
class] is unlikely. The complaint alleges that there is a relatively small loss to
each individual class member. In such a case separate actions would be eco-
nomically unfeasible. It is more likely that, absent a class suit, defendant will
retain the benefits from its alleged wrongs.
Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738. Further, as pointed out by one com-
mentator:
Class actions could permit consumers who are the victims of similar violations
to join in a single suit under the direction of one or more victims. Such joinder
increases the likelihood and effectiveness of private action in a number of ways.
For example, it would compensate for the fact that few victims are sufficiently
motivated on their own to bring an action. Moreover, although individual
recovery is basically unchanged the members of the class may share attorney's
fees and costs . . . . Because the aggregate recovery possible is potentially very
great, attorneys who would be reluctant to undertake a suit on behalf of an
individual victim might be attracted to an action on behalf of a class... .
Boyd, supra note 79, at 184 n.105. See also Starrs, The Consumer Class Action—Part II:
Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U. L. Rev. 407, 408-15 (1969); Dole, Consumer Class
Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 80, 81 (1969);
and Note, Class Actions Under the Truth-In-Lending Act, 47 Notre Dame Lawyer 1305
(1972).
103 The Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee has, in S. 652,
suggested an amendment to $ 130(a) which would provide for class actions under the
Act. The bill provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to
comply with any requirement imposed under this chapter or chapter 4 of this
title (other than section 161) with respect to any person is liable to such person
In an amount equal to the sum of—
(1) any actual damages sustained by such person as a result of the
failure;
(2) such punitive damages as the court may allow, except that such
damages shall (A) be not less than $100 in the case of an individual action,
or (B) in the case of a class action, not more than the lesser of $50,000,
or 2 per centum of the net worth of the creditor as of the end of the
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Ratner, then, has interpreted Section 127(b) (6) of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act as being "protective" in scope and requiring
as least a nominal annual percentage rate disclosure on the monthly
billing statement to an obligor in an open end credit transaction, even
if the obligor has not incurred a finance charge. This required disclosure
will effectively assist the consumer to compare credit costs, and enable
him to determine which creditor offers the best deal. In addition, the
court determined that since the paramount purpose of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act is to provide consumer protection, only clerical
errors are sufficient to exempt creditors from the Act's civil proscriptions
and that, accordingly, even "reasonable" mistakes are violations of the
Act. The import of this conclusion is that the creditor will not be able
to experiment with obligors' rights under the Act, and see how far the
language can be stretched. Finally, by denying plaintiff class recovery
the court concluded that class actions might not always be proper under
the.Act.
CHARLES J. HANSEN •
Labor Law—Unions—Political Campaign Contributions—United
States v. Pipefitters Local 562.1--In 1949, Local No. 562 of the Pipe-
fitters Union established the Pipefitters Voluntary Political, Educa-
tional, Legislative, Charity and Defense Fund (Fund). Until the end
of 1962, the Fund was maintained solely by the assessments of mem-
bers of Local 562 and members of other unions working within Local
562's jurisdiction. The assessments were in addition to the union dues.
During this time each union member was assessed a specified amount
for each eight hour work day. These assessments were collected directly
creditor's fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year in which the
failure occurred; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing
liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee
which shall be the reasonable value of the services rendered by the attorney
without regard to the amount of any recovery.
In determining the amount of punitive damages in any class action, the court
shall consider, among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor,
the resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the
extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
S. 652, § 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Senator Proxmire has called S. 652 the "'Bank
Protection Act of 1972.'" S. Rep. No. 92-750, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1972). As to the
class action provision, Senator Proxmire states that the amendment would weaken the
Consumer Credit Protection Act's civil liability provisions and concludes ,that the
"maximum liability figure should be substantially raised in order to provide a meaningful
compliance by large creditors." Id. at 33.
1 434 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on rehearing, 434 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. granted, 402 U.S. 994 (1971). The case was argued before the Supreme Court in
January, 1972.
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